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REVITALIZING THE BAN ON CONVERSION THERAPY: 
AN AFFIRMATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
CONVERSION THERAPY BANS 
Logan Kline 
INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment’s Freedom of Speech Clause stands as a 
foundational pillar of the United States legal system.1 The First 
Amendment decrees that “Congress shall make no law… abridging the 
freedom of speech.”2 But how far does this right extend? This question 
has fueled one of the most hotly contested and time-honored legal debates 
in American jurisprudence.3 While freedom of speech is granted 
expansive protections, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
unquestionably defined its limitations.4 As far back as 1919, Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously explained that as expansive as the First 
Amendment is, it still does not protect a man who falsely shouted fire in 
a theatre to cause a frenzy.5 Although the Supreme Court has answered a 
variety of major free speech questions in the intervening century since 
Holmes’ opinion, the debate over freedom of speech limitations in more 
nuanced contexts rages on the modern judicial stage. Put plainly, 
American jurisprudence has yet to reach consensus on when an 
individual’s freedom of speech rights end and the government’s interest 
in regulating speech begins.6  
Engaging with this time-honored debate, this Article examines one 
such split among the Federal Circuit Courts: whether freedom of speech 
protections extend into the office of a therapist. Specifically, that split 
centers on whether state laws prohibiting licensed therapists from 
providing conversion therapy violate those therapists’ First Amendment 
freedom of speech rights. The speech at issue—conversion therapy—is a 
 
 1.  U.S. Const. amend I. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  See generally Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652 (1925); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969). 
 4.  Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. 
and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014), 
abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Otto v. City of 
Boca Raton, Fla., 981 F.3d 854 (C.A.11 (Fla.), 2020). These cases exemplify the dissonance within the 
federal judiciary surrounding the line where personal liberties give way to state interests, specifically with 
reference to the content of this Article. 
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practice that attempts to change the sexual orientation or gender identity 
of an LGBTQ+ individual, often a minor.7 Until recently, the Third and 
Ninth Circuits had consistently upheld such restrictions.8 However, the 
Supreme Court in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. 
Becerra signaled a potential jurisprudential shift when it struck down an 
exception to free speech called “professional speech,” which the Third 
and Ninth Circuits had relied on in their opinions.9 Subsequently, in 2020, 
the Eleventh Circuit in Otto v. City of Boca Raton split with the Third and 
Ninth Circuits, holding that a statutory ban on conversion therapy violated 
the First Amendment, because even if the speech was controversial, it was 
protected from government regulation.10  
Part I of this Note examines the scientific landscape as well as the legal 
and real-world implications of the controversial practice of conversion 
therapy. Next, Part II addresses the legal reasoning in support of bans on 
conversion therapy by analyzing the decision of the Ninth Circuit in 
Pickup v. Brown and of the Third Circuit in King v. Governor of N.J.11 
From there, Part III presents the opposing argument that bans on 
conversion therapy are unconstitutional and violate the First 
Amendment’s Freedom of Speech Clause. Part III first examines the 
Supreme Court’s decision in National Institute of Family and Life 
Advocates v. Becerra and then analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s recent 
decision in Otto v. City of Boca Raton.12 Finally, Part IV argues that even 
in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Becerra, the ban on conversion 
therapy should be deemed constitutional because therapy is a mental 
health treatment rather than speech, and a ban on conversion therapy 
constitutes a government interest sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny.   
I. ISSUE BACKGROUND AND STAKES 
Before diving into the legal analysis surrounding whether conversion 
therapy qualifies as protected speech under the First Amendment, an 
understanding of the scientific landscape of the therapy is necessary. In 
freedom of speech analyses, the context of the speech is vital to a court’s 
 
 7.  Christy Mallory et al., Conversion Therapy and LGBT Youth, UCLA WILLIAMS INST. (June 
2019), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Conversion-Therapy-Update-Jun-2019. 
pdf. 
 8.  King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and 
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014), 
abrogated by Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361. 
 9.  National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S.Ct. 2361, 2371-73 (2018). 
 10.  Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Fla., 981 F.3d 854 (C.A.11 (Fla.), 2020). 
 11.  King, 767 F.3d 216; Pickup, 740 F.3d 1208. 
 12.  National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S.Ct. 2361, 2371-73 (2018); 
Otto, 981 F.3d 854. 
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determination of the extent of protection that should be afforded to that 
speech.13 This Part first defines conversion therapy, providing statistics 
on both the number of individuals subjected to it and states that have 
banned the practice. Then, this Part explains the scientific community’s 
consensus regarding conversion therapy.  
Conversion therapy is a controversial practice which seeks to change 
the sexual orientation or gender identity of an individual, often a minor.14 
Conversion therapy is grounded in the belief that LGBTQ+ is abnormal 
and that treatment can change the orientation or gender identity of an 
LGBTQ+ individual.15 Twenty states, Washington DC, and Puerto Rico 
have banned or restricted healthcare professionals from using conversion 
therapy on minors.16 Research shows that as of 2019, 698,000 adults in 
the United States have been exposed to conversion therapy and about half 
of those adults were subjected to the practice during adolescence.17 
Throughout the extensive history of conversion therapy in the United 
States, a variety of techniques have been employed by both healthcare 
professionals and religious advisors.18 While talk therapy is currently the 
most common type of conversion therapy, other more gruesome and 
dangerous tactics are still employed by some practitioners.19 Conversion 
therapy can generally be divided into two categories: aversive and non-
aversive.20 Aversive “therapies” can include torturous practices such as 
inducing nausea, vomiting, or paralysis, providing electric shocks, or 
having the individual snap an elastic band around their wrist when 
aroused by same-sex thoughts.21 Meanwhile, non-aversive techniques 
include hypnosis, reframing, and redirecting thoughts.22 
While twenty states have banned conversion therapy, thirty others still 
 
 13.  See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (establishing 
the test for student speech in public schools); Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 
576 U.S. 200 (2015) (evaluating government speech for a free speech analysis); C. Hudson Gas & Elec. 
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (establishing a First Amendment analysis for 
commercial speech restrictions). 
 14.  Mallory, supra note 7.  
 15.  Id. 
 16.  The Lies and Dangers of Efforts to Change Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, HUMAN 
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, (last accessed February 20, 2021) (listing the states that have banned conversion 
therapy: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, 
Vermont, and Washington). 
 17.  Mallory, supra note 7. This range only includes adults between the ages of eighteen and fifty-
nine. There are likely even more adults above this age range, and there are thousands of youths currently 
be subjected to conversion therapy. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id.  
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
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allow the practice, despite the myriad of national organizations that 
openly oppose conversion therapy and support legislative prohibitions of 
it.23 According to the American Academy of Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatry:  
[There is] no evidence to support the application of any ‘therapeutic 
intervention’ operating under the premise that a specific sexual orientation, 
gender identity, and/or gender expression is pathological. Furthermore, 
based on the scientific evidence, the AACAP asserts that such ‘conversion 
therapies’ (or other interventions imposed with the intent of promoting a 
particular sexual orientation and/or gender as a preferred outcome) lack 
scientific credibility and clinical utility. Additionally, there is evidence that 
such interventions are harmful. As a result, ‘conversion therapies’ should 
not be part of any behavioral health treatment of children and 
adolescents.24 
The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry is far from 
alone in this stance. In fact, the vast majority of medical and psychiatric 
associations condemn conversion therapy and support legal prohibitions 
of the practice.25 
In short, the national scientific community has reached a near 
consensus: conversion therapy is not only ineffective in achieving its 
stated purpose but also can be extremely harmful to those subjected to 
it.26 People who have undergone conversion therapy report higher rates of 
anxiety, depression, and other mental health conditions.27 Therefore, the 
discussion of whether a state can ban licensed therapists from practicing 
conversion therapy has greater stakes than the academic discourse 
constrained to the halls of a law school building. In states without 
conversion therapy bans, thousands of people are subjected to this 
 
 23.  Conversion Therapy Bans by U.S. State, BORN PERFECT (Last accessed April 18, 2021), 
https://bornperfect.org/facts/conversion-therapy-bans-by-state/. 
 24.  The AACAP Policy on “Conversion Therapies, AM. ACAD. OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT 
PSYCHIATRY (2018).  
 25.  Policy and Position Statements on Conversion Therapy, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (last 
accessed Feb. 20, 2021), https://www.hrc.org/resources/policy-and-position-statements-on-conversion-
therapy. Other national organizations that have condemned the practice and/or openly supported 
legislative restraint of conversion therapy include: the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American 
Association for Marriage and Family Therapy, the American College of Physicians, the American 
Counseling Association, the American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, 
National Association of Social Workers, the American Psychological Association, and many more. 
 26.  The Lies and Dangers of Efforts to Change Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, HUMAN 
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (last accessed February 20, 2021); Conversion Therapy, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW 
CENTER (last accessed Feb. 20, 2021), https://www.splcenter.org/issues/lgbt-rights/conversion-therapy 
(“People who have undergone conversion therapy have reported increased anxiety, depression, and in 
some cases, suicidal ideation. It can also strain family relationships, because practitioners frequently 
blame a parent for their child’s sexual orientation.”). 
 27.  Id. 
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emotionally abusive practice each year.28 In light of these high stakes, 
several Federal Circuit Courts have considered arguments for and against 
conversion therapy bans in recent years, leading to divergent holdings 
regarding the legality of such bans between circuits. 
II. LEGAL POSITION IN SUPPORT OF BAN ON CONVERSION THERAPY 
In 2014, the Ninth and the Third Circuits upheld as constitutional 
statewide bans on the use of conversion therapy by licensed therapists.29 
This Part first outlines the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pickup v. Brown 
that upheld California’s ban on conversion therapy.30 This Part then turns 
to the Third Circuit’s holding in King v. Governor of New Jersey, where 
the Third Circuit also upheld New Jersey’s ban on conversion therapy, 
albeit based on a different rationale.31 
In Pickup v. Brown, plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of 
California Senate Bill 1172, a statewide ban on state-licensed mental 
health providers engaging in “sexual orientation change efforts” (SOCE) 
with patients younger than eighteen-years-old.32 The plaintiffs argued that 
the ban violated the First Amendment and infringed on several other 
constitutional rights.33 The Ninth Circuit first noted that the practice of 
conversion therapy, or SOCE, began in a time when homosexuality was 
considered an illness, which has since been debunked by the scientific 
community for nearly half a century.34 Then, the Ninth Circuit identified 
a wide array of topics the legislation did not restrict, noting specifically 
that licensed therapists were free to say whatever they wanted about the 
therapy in public or even recommend it to their patients.35 Further, 
 
 28.  Mallory, supra note 7.  
 29.  King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and 
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014), 
abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 30.  Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life 
Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).  
 31.  King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and 
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 32.  Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1221 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and 
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id. at 1223. (writing that SB 1172 did not do any of the following: “Prevent mental health 
providers from communicating with the public about SOCE; Prevent mental health providers from 
expressing their views to patients, whether children or adults, about SOCE, homosexuality, or any other 
topic; Prevent mental health providers from recommending SOCE to patients, whether children or adults; 
Prevent mental health providers from administering SOCE to any person who is 18 years of age or older; 
Prevent mental health providers from referring minors to unlicensed counselors, such as religious leaders; 
Prevent unlicensed providers, such as religious leaders, from administering SOCE to children or adults; 
or Prevent minors from seeking SOCE from mental health providers in other states.”). 
5
Kline: Revitalizing the Ban on Conversion Therapy
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications,
628 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90 
unlicensed counselors could still practice SOCE, and therapists could 
refer their patients for this treatment.36 The court framed the ban’s scope 
as follows: 
SB 1172 does just one thing: it requires licensed mental health providers 
in California who wish to engage in “practices ... that seek to change a 
[minor's] sexual orientation” either to wait until the minor turns 18 or be 
subject to professional discipline. Thus, SB 1172 regulates the provision of 
mental treatment, but leaves mental health providers free to discuss or 
recommend treatment and to express their views on any topic.37 
The legislature enacted the bill to protect minors and LGBTQ+ 
individuals from the “serious harms caused by sexual orientation change 
efforts.”38  
The Ninth Circuit then moved on to its free speech analysis of the bill.39 
First, the court looked to precedent and determined that, while 
communication about treatment is protected by the First Amendment, the 
government has more power to regulate the act of administering the 
treatment.40 Further, the Ninth Circuit held that therapists do not receive 
special First Amendment protections merely because they deliver their 
treatment through speech. The Court explained that while speech made 
during therapy does receive some protection, it is not immune from state 
regulation.41 The Ninth Circuit then established a continuum of medical 
professional speech regulation, with complete protection of speech 
afforded to medical professionals on one end, and no protection of speech 
afforded on the other.42 The court’s task was to determine where along 
this continuum of First Amendment protection the facts of the case 
appropriately fit.43 
On one end of the continuum was speech that is undoubtedly protected, 
such as when a doctor publicly advocates a treatment.44 This type of 
speech is entirely protected, as it falls within the heart of the First 
 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id.; see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.1 (West 2021). 
 38.  Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1223. (citing 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 835, § 1(n)). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 1226-27 (citing Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. California Bd. 
of Psych., 228 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2000) and Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id.; See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (“Where the personal 
nexus between professional and client does not exist, and a speaker does not purport to be exercising 
judgment on behalf of any particular individual with whose circumstances he is directly acquainted, 
government regulation ceases to function as legitimate regulation of professional practice with only 
incidental impact on speech; it becomes regulation of speaking or publishing as such, subject to the First 
Amendment’s command that ‘Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press.’”). 
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Amendment’s intended scope—issues of public concern communicated 
to the masses.45 At the midpoint of this continuum was speech that occurs 
within the doctor-patient professional relationship.46 Protection for this 
speech is not absolute, as the state can prevent doctors from giving false 
information or performing “quack medicine” with the threat of revoking 
medical licenses.47 Therefore, the court explained that while some 
protection is afforded to speech in the doctor-patient relationship, the First 
Amendment tolerates much more speech regulation in this context.48 The 
court defended a higher degree of regulation as appropriate under the First 
Amendment because “[w]hen professionals, by means of their state-
issued licenses, form relationships with clients, the purpose of those 
relationships is to advance the welfare of the clients, rather than to 
contribute to public debate.”49  
Conversely, professional conduct falls on the opposite end of the 
continuum, where speech is afforded the least amount of First 
Amendment protection.50 According to the Ninth Circuit, the California 
law fell at this end of the First Amendment protection continuum.51 This 
meant the state’s power to regulate professional conduct was 
considerable, even if that regulation resulted in an incidental effect on the 
professional’s speech.52 Therefore, even though all medical treatments 
utilize speech in some capacity during implementation, the state has the 
power to ban a medical treatment without risk of violating the First 
Amendment.53 The court analogized conversion therapy to medication 
and explained that “[w]hen a drug is banned, for example, a doctor who 
treats patients with that drug does not have a First Amendment right to 
speak the words necessary to provide or administer the banned drug.”54 
The speech that facilitates the banned act is also allowed to be regulated 
in this context.55 
The Ninth Circuit applied the continuum to the law in question and 
concluded that SB 1172 addressed the conduct of licensed therapists and 
fell into the professional conduct category—under which the government 
 
 45.  Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1226-27.; See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (“Speech 
on matters of public concern is at the heart of the First Amendment's protection.”). 
 46.  Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1228. 
 47.  Id.; See Conant v. McCaffrey, 2000 WL 1281174, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2000).  
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 1229. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
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has the most power to regulate speech.56 Therefore, the court held that 
California possessed the authority through its police power to regulate the 
administration of certain harmful therapies by licensed therapists.57 In 
short, the conversion therapy ban was upheld as constitutional. 
That same year, the Third Circuit reached the same conclusion in 
evaluating the constitutionality of New Jersey’s ban on conversion 
therapy in King v. Governor of N.J.58 Like in California, New Jersey’s 
ban prohibited licensed therapists from engaging in conversion therapy 
with persons under the age of eighteen.59 However, the Third Circuit’s 
reasoning in King diverged from the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Pickup.60 
In King, the Third Circuit expressly rejected the argument that conversion 
therapy qualified as unprotected conduct.61 Instead, the court held that 
“the verbal communication that occurs during SOCE counseling is speech 
that enjoys some degree of protection under the First Amendment.”62 
According to the court, this level of protection is diminished “[b]ecause 
[p]laintiffs are speaking as state-licensed professionals within the 
confines of a professional relationship.”63 Based on this conclusion, the 
Third Circuit applied a more conventional constitutional test.64 If the New 
Jersey law advanced a substantial state interest in protecting residents 
from harmful professional practices and did so in the least invasive way 
to serve that interest, then the prohibition would survive.65 
The Third Circuit determined that the verbal communication in a 
conversion therapy session was speech and that to find otherwise would 
be counterintuitive and contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s 
holding in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.66 In Holder, the Court 
held that when communication of a message was at issue, the verbal 
communication—such as the verbal communication in a conversion 
therapy session—was considered speech rather than conduct.67 According 
to the Court, the nature of the communication did not change the verbal 
communication from speech to conduct.68 
 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and 
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 59.  Id. at 221. 
 60.  King, 767 F.3d 216; Pickup, 740 F.3d 1208. 
 61.  King, 767 F.3d at 224. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id.; Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
 67.  Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2705. 
 68.  Id. 
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Next, the Third Circuit distinguished its analysis from the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Pickup.69 The Third Circuit criticized the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding in Pickup for never explaining how to actually apply its 
continuum to determine whether a statute regulates speech or conduct.70 
Further, the Third Circuit explained that because the Ninth Circuit’s test 
provided no criteria for how to decide whether verbal communication is 
speech or conduct, the test is susceptible to manipulation and abuse.71 
According to the Third Circuit, “[t]o classify some communications as 
‘speech’ and others as ‘conduct’ is to engage in nothing more than a 
‘labeling game.’”72 The court explained that speech should be evaluated 
as such under the First Amendment rather than being twisted into conduct 
through mental gymnastics.73 However, the court noted that merely 
because something is speech does not automatically entitle that speech to 
the First Amendment’s protections.74  
After determining that the communication that occurs within a 
conversion therapy session is speech, the Third Circuit addressed the 
appropriate level of protection for this professional speech.75 Similar to 
the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the midpoint of its continuum analysis, 
the Third Circuit reasoned that New Jersey’s police power granted it the 
right to regulate certain trades, particularly those related to public 
health.76 The Third Circuit relied on the United States Supreme Court’s 
pronouncement in Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar that states have “broad power 
to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the 
practice of professions.”77 The Third Circuit ultimately concluded that the 
speech involved in a conversion therapy session can be classified as 
“professional speech” and is therefore entitled to a lower degree of First 
Amendment protection.78 The court explained its reasoning by noting that 
 
 69.  King, 767 F.3d at 226-28. 
 70.  Id. at 228. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1215–16 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (“[B]y what criteria do we distinguish between utterances that are truly ‘speech,’ on 
the one hand, and those that are, on the other hand, somehow ‘treatment’ or ‘conduct’?”).  
 71.  King, 767 F.3d at 228. 
 72.  Id. quoting Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1218 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
 73.  Id. (“Simply put, speech is speech, and it must be analyzed as such for purposes of the First 
Amendment. Certain categories of speech receive lesser protection, or even no protection at all… But 
these categories are deeply rooted in history, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against 
exercising ‘freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First 
Amendment.’”). 
 74.  Id. at 229; see, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978); Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957). 
 75.  Id.  
 76.  Id. citing Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910). 
 77.  Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975). 
 78.  King, 767 F.3d at 232. 
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most professions inevitably include communications between the client 
and the professional.79 Mental health counselors in particular 
communicate with their clients by necessity of their position.80 So, “[t]o 
handcuff the State's ability to regulate a profession whenever speech is 
involved would therefore unduly undermine its authority to protect its 
citizens from harm.”81 
Therefore, despite the Third Circuit’s disagreement with the Ninth 
Circuit’s characterization of  communication made during conversion 
therapy as conduct rather than speech, the Third Circuit concluded that, 
as professional speech, such communication was not afforded full First 
Amendment protection.82 Unlike non-expressive conduct, which receives 
no First Amendment protection, professional speech merely receives 
diminished protection.83  
In reviewing professional speech, the Third Circuit applied 
intermediate scrutiny, whereas other forms of speech would normally 
trigger strict scrutiny.84 In applying intermediate scrutiny, the court held 
“a prohibition of professional speech is permissible only if it ‘directly 
advances’ the State's ‘substantial’ interest in protecting clients from 
ineffective or harmful professional services, and is ‘not more extensive 
than necessary to serve that interest.’”85 Under intermediate scrutiny, New 
Jersey’s interest in protecting its citizens from ineffective and potentially 
dangerous professional practices was found to be sufficient to justify the 
state’s ban on conversion therapy.86 
Despite disagreements regarding the proper First Amendment analysis 
of state laws regulating conversion therapy, both the Ninth and Third 
Circuit ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the ban.87 
III. LEGAL POSITION BARRING BAN ON CONVERSION THERAPY 
In the Ninth and Third Circuit opinions that upheld bans on conversion 
 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 233. 
 84.  Id. at 234-35 (comparing professional speech to commercial speech, concluding that just as 
intermediate scrutiny is applied to commercial speech, it should similarly be applied to professional 
speech. The court concluded that A3371 falls within a category of permissible content discrimination 
similar to the court’s analysis in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). The R.A.V. court 
wrote that a statute does not trigger strict scrutiny “[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination consists 
entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable.”). 
 85.  Id. at 235 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm. Of New York, 447 
U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). 
 86.  Id. at 237. 
 87.  King, 767 F.3d 216; Pickup, 740 F.3d 1208.  
10
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss2/6
2021] REVITALIZING THE BAN 633 
therapy performed by state-licensed therapists, both courts relied on a 
“professional speech” exception that allowed for lesser First Amendment 
protection for therapists in their professional capacity.88 However, these 
holdings were abrogated by the United States Supreme Court’s holding 
in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, which 
rejected the “professional speech” exception.89 Based on Becerra, the 
Eleventh Circuit struck down Boca Raton and Palm Beach County, 
Florida’s bans on conversion therapy in Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 
Florida.90  
In Becerra, the Supreme Court struck down the professional speech 
exemption that was previously asserted by the Ninth and Third Circuits.91 
This case evaluated the constitutionality of a California law requiring: 1) 
licensed pregnancy-related clinics to give notice of publicly-funded 
family planning services, and 2) unlicensed pregnancy-related clinics to 
provide notice of their lack of licensure.92 Two crisis pregnancy centers 
and an organization of crisis pregnancy centers brought this action, 
alleging that both notice requirements violated their First Amendment 
freedom of speech rights.93 Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the 
opinion of the Court, rejecting professional speech as a separate category 
entitled to a different level of protection.94 Justice Thomas began by 
laying out the form of freedom of speech analysis that the Court does 
recognize.95 He first noted that precedent distinguished between enforcing 
prohibitions on content-based and content-neutral regulation of speech.96 
If a regulation is found to be content-based, or based on communicative 
content, it is presumptively unconstitutional unless the state can prove 
that the law has been “narrowly tailored to serve compelling state 
interests.”97 
The Court then directly addressed the Ninth and Third Circuit opinions 
that recognized professional speech as an exception to the strict scrutiny 
that accompanies content-based regulations.98 However, Justice Thomas 
 
 88.  King, 767 F.3d 216; Pickup, 740 F.3d 1208.  
 89.  Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 90.  Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2020). 
 91.  Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361. 
 92.  Id. at 2365. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 2372-73. 
 95.  Id. at 2371. 
 96.  Id.; See also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) (“Content-based laws—those that 
target speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be 
justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state 
interests.”). 
 97.  Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371. (quoting Reed, 576 U.S. at 163). 
 98.  Id. 
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noted that the Supreme Court had never recognized this professional 
speech exception and thus was unwilling to exempt this category of 
speech from the strict scrutiny analysis.99 
While professional “[s]peech is not protected merely because it is 
uttered by ‘professionals,’” the Court identified two situations in which 
professional speech has been afforded less protection.100 First, a more 
deferential review has been afforded to laws that require professionals to 
disclose factual information.101 Second, states may regulate professional 
conduct, even if that conduct incidentally involved speech.102 However, 
the Court noted that neither of these two potential exceptions applied in 
Becerra.103 In sum, the Court ruled that professional speech does not 
trigger a lower level of scrutiny, and while there are two exceptions where 
lower protection of speech is justified, neither were implicated in 
Becerra.104 
Two years after the Court’s decision in Becerra, the Eleventh Circuit 
in Otto relied on that decision when it struck down conversion therapy 
bans from the city of Boca Raton and Palm Beach County.105 In Otto, two 
therapists alleged that the restrictions imposed by these laws, which 
applied even to purely speech-based therapy, unconstitutionally restricted 
their speech while interacting with their clients.106 The city and county 
bans were largely identical, barring covered therapists from treating 
minors with: 
any counseling, practice or treatment performed with the goal of changing 
an individual's sexual orientation or gender identity, including, but not 
limited to, efforts to change behaviors, gender identity, or gender 
expression, or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attractions or 
feelings toward individuals of the same gender or sex.107 
Both ordinances also contained an exception for counseling to assist those 
undergoing a gender transition.108 The two plaintiffs in this case were 
state-licensed therapists who, among other services, provided talk-
therapy counseling for minors “who [had] unwanted same-sex attraction 
 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id.; see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Milavetz, 
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n., 
436 U.S. 447, 455–456 (1978). 
 102.  Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371.; See also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 884 (1992). 
 103.  Id.  
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2020). 
 106.  Id. at 859. 
 107.  Id. at 859-60. 
 108.  Id. at 860. 
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or unwanted gender identity issues.”109 According to the plaintiffs, the 
therapy sessions consisted entirely of speech, with no physical element.110 
Further, the plaintiffs alleged that the ordinances banning SOCE were 
content-based restrictions because they targeted specific communications 
the local government disagreed with.111 
First, the Eleventh Circuit determined whether the city and county 
ordinances constituted content-based regulations.112 If so, that finding 
would mandate strict scrutiny.113 Otherwise, intermediate or rational basis 
scrutiny could serve as more deferential standards of review.114 However, 
the Eleventh Circuit disposed of this question rather quickly, stating that 
“because the ordinances depend on what is said, they are content-based 
restrictions that must receive strict scrutiny.”115 The court noted that the 
desirability of the content being restricted is immaterial, writing that if 
favorable content is allowed and horrifying content is restricted, this 
constitutes content-based regulation regardless of how desirable the 
outcome may be.116 The Eleventh Circuit noted that this determination 
was straightforward, because the regulations limited a category of 
people—therapists—from communicating a message, SOCE.117 Finally, 
the court noted that the content-based nature of the ordinance is codified 
by the exception outlined in both ordinances for those undergoing a 
gender transition.118 This exception specifically applied to gender 
transition and not sexual orientation, which the court took as evidence that 
the ban was not only content-based but also viewpoint-based, which is 
“an egregious form of content discrimination.”119 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the local government’s contention that 
the ordinances regulated conduct rather than speech.120 The court 
reasoned that relabeling controversial speech as conduct is impermissible 
and quoted the Third Circuit’s decision in King, noting that “the enterprise 
of labeling certain verbal or written communications ‘speech’ and others 
‘conduct’ is unprincipled and susceptible to manipulation.”121 However, 
 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 861. 
 112.  Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Fla., 981 F.3d 854, 861 (11th Cir. 2020). 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. at 862. 
 117.  Id. at 863. 
 118.  Id at 864. 
 119.  Id. quoting Rosenberger v. Rector of U. of Va, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). The Eleventh Circuit 
also noted that a strong argument exists that viewpoint discrimination is per se unconstitutional, and these 
bans are thus unconstitutional on their face. Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 861 (quoting King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 228 (3d Cir. 2014)). 
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beyond this point of agreement, the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis diverged 
from the Third Circuit’s decision in King, relying in part on the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Becerra, which was decided after King.122 The 
Eleventh Circuit identified Becerra as precedent for its rejection of an 
attempt to regulate speech by reframing it as professional conduct and 
stated that “local governments cannot rescue their ordinances by calling 
the plaintiff’s speech conduct.”123  
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the exception to strict scrutiny 
for incidental speech entangled with regulated professional conduct.124 
States have the right to regulate professional conduct, even if that conduct 
involves some speech.125 However, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the 
argument that the exception applied in this case and instead asserted that 
the therapy is carried out entirely through speech.126 Therefore, it cannot 
be accurately described as conduct just to trigger a lower degree of 
scrutiny.127 The court summarized its position on this issue succinctly, 
writing that “the ordinances are direct, not incidental, regulations of 
speech… they are not connected to any regulation of separately 
identifiable conduct.”128 
Further, the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on its opinion from three 
years earlier in Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida.129 In 
Wollschlaeger, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the state could not restrict 
a doctor’s ability to discuss firearms and firearm safety with their 
patients.130 The Otto court reasoned that, just as a law cannot restrict 
whether a doctor can discuss guns with their patient, a law cannot limit a 
therapist’s ability to employ conversion therapy.131 
Once the Eleventh Circuit decided that strict scrutiny was the 
appropriate standard of review, the court then evaluated whether the 
ordinances were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest.132 Here, the court conceded that the state indisputably had a 
compelling interest “in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-
 
 122.  Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); King v. Governor 
of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 228 (3d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 123.  Otto, 981 F.3d at 861; see generally Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. 
Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id.; see Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. 
 126.  Otto, 981 F.3d at 861. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 865. 
 129.  Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Fla., 981 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2020); Wollschlaeger v. Gov., Fla., 
848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 130.  Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d 1293. 
 131.  Otto, 981 F.3d 854; See generally Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d 1293. 
 132.  Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Fla., 981 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2020). 
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being of a minor.”133 However, the Eleventh Circuit asserted that this 
compelling interest did not include the power to restrict ideas the 
government deemed unsuitable for children.134 According to the court, 
even if preventing conversion therapy satisfied a compelling government 
interest, the government still had the burden to prove the law was 
narrowly tailored to that end.135 At this point, the Eleventh Circuit noted 
that the burden of proof under strict scrutiny is nearly impassable, and 
adequate justification is exceedingly rare under the standard.136 Even in 
light of a series of studies and reports presented by the defendants and 
various amici, the court found no compelling interest sufficient to justify 
the bans on conversion therapy and thus struck down the bans.137 
By refusing to apply a lower level of scrutiny in its First Amendment 
analysis of professional speech in Becerra, the United States Supreme 
Court set the stage for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Otto.138 Absent 
the professional speech exception, Otto struck down bans on conversion 
therapy as unconstitutional violations of therapists’ freedom of speech.139  
IV. DISCUSSION 
At first glance, the Supreme Court’s decision in Becerra seems to 
signal the end of state bans of conversion therapy.140 In fact, the Eleventh 
Circuit seems to have come to that same conclusion in Otto.141 However, 
this understanding of the Becerra opinion assumes that the viability of 
state bans on conversion therapy is entirely interwoven with the existence 
of an exception for professional speech. On the contrary, there are two 
primary arguments in a post-Becerra jurisprudence for a conversion 
therapy ban to be upheld. This Part first argues that conversion therapy is 
not protected by the First Amendment because it is a mental health 
treatment. Therefore, it should be susceptible to regulation in the same 
way that prescription of a medication may be regulated. Second, it argues 
that even if conversion therapy is speech that would normally be 
protected, the government has a compelling interest in protecting the 
wellbeing of minors to justify a ban and satisfy the strict scrutiny standard. 
 
 133.  Id. at 868 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 134.  Id. (citing Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 794–95 (2011)). 
 135.  Id. (citing Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 at 171 (2015)). 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Otto v. City of 
Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2020). 
 139.  Otto, 981 F.3d at 872. 
 140.  See infra notes 91-104 and accompanying text. 
 141.  See infra notes 105-137 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, this Part identifies potential statutory language for drafting a post-
Becerra conversion therapy ban that would have a strong chance of being 
upheld as constitutional.  
A. Conversion Therapy is a Medical Procedure Rather than Speech 
First, when the Eleventh Circuit characterized conversion therapy as a 
form of speech rather than a medical procedure, it oversimplified the 
therapy to fit a traditional First Amendment analysis. The Otto court even 
acknowledged this, stating that “[t]he local governments are not entirely 
wrong when they characterize speech-based SOCE as a course of conduct. 
SOCE, after all, is a therapy, and plaintiffs say they want to ‘engage’ in 
it.”142 The Ninth Circuit also recognized this reality in Pickup, reasoning 
that the state has a right to regulate professional conduct even if that 
regulation has an effect on the therapist’s speech.143 The Ninth Circuit 
addressed this point and explained that a physician does not have a First 
Amendment right to prescribe an illegal substance just because he says it 
in words rather than jots it down.144 In that situation, the state’s regulation 
of speech is incidental to the policy behind the ban—to prohibit doctors 
from prescribing illegal substances.145 
Administering therapy is a form of professional conduct that takes a 
variety of forms, and the practice should not be shielded by the First 
Amendment simply because most of the therapy manifests as speech. In 
analyzing conversion therapy, the Eleventh Circuit in Otto missed the 
forest for the trees.146 Certainly, the implementation of conversion therapy 
is mostly verbal, but applying the veneer of First Amendment protection 
to the words said in a conversion therapy session makes no more sense 
than protecting the words of the doctor prescribing a banned 
medication.147 The banned drug or conversion therapy are the aim of the 
ban, while the speech that implements the treatment is incidentally banned 
as well. 
Part of the disconnect seems to stem from a reluctance to recognize 
mental health as a legitimate condition that is medically treatable through 
 
 142.  Otto, 981 F.3d at 865-866. 
 143.  Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and 
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  An idiomatic phrase that indicates a person has become so engrossed in the details of a 
situation that they have missed the bigger picture.  
 147.  Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1228 (“When a drug is banned, for example, a doctor who treats patients 
with that drug does not have a First Amendment right to speak the words necessary to provide or 
administer the banned drug.”). 
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therapy.148 When a professional engages in conversion therapy, they are 
not simply talking to their client. Instead, they are purporting to engage 
in a mental health treatment. Even if this treatment is not as tangible as a 
pill or narcotic, the state has an equal interest in its regulation. 
B. The Government’s Interest Should Have Passed Strict Scrutiny 
The Eleventh Circuit should have recognized in Otto that the 
conversion therapy ban was supported by a compelling government 
interest because it aimed to protect the wellbeing of children, thus 
overcoming the admittedly stringent strict scrutiny standard.149 Early in 
the opinion, the Eleventh Circuit indicated that “whether the government's 
disagreement is for good reasons, great reasons, or terrible reasons has 
nothing at all to do with [the analysis].”150 This recognition, paired with 
the court’s characterization that strict scrutiny is seldom overcome, 
showed the court’s unwillingness to engage in a true strict scrutiny 
analysis.151 Even if one were to concede that conversion therapy is speech 
and warrants strict scrutiny, the strict scrutiny analysis should be applied 
as an unbiased test. Just because strict scrutiny often stands as an 
impassable challenge does not mean that a court should write the analysis 
off as a formality.152 The strict scrutiny standard is by no means meant to 
be a forgone conclusion, but the Eleventh Circuit seems to treat it as the 
death knell of the defense’s argument.153  
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the defense’s argument that the 
conversion therapy ban constituted a compelling government interest with 
circular logic and ignored the merits of the evidence presented to the 
court. The court acknowledged that the psychological and physical safety 
of children is undeniably a compelling governmental interest that satisfies 
strict scrutiny.154 The municipalities presented numerous reports and 
studies establishing the real harm posed by conversion therapy.155 Further, 
countless professional organizations supported the defense’s position 
 
 148.  Psychotherapy Works, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (Nov. 1, 2013), 
https://www.apa.org/topics/psychotherapy/works.  
 149.  Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Fla., 981 F.3d 854, 880 (11th Cir. 2020) (Martin, J. dissenting) 
(“Instances in which a speech restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest are deservedly 
rare. But they do exist.”). 
 150.  Otto, 981 F.3d at 863. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 514-15 (2005) (“Strict scrutiny is not ‘strict in theory, 
but fatal in fact’…The fact that strict scrutiny applies ‘says nothing about the ultimate validity of any 
particular law; that determination is the job of the court applying strict scrutiny.’” (quoting Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229-30 (1995)). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Otto, 981 F.3d at 868. 
 155.  Id. at 868-69. 
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with amici and their own research.156 However, the court rejected this 
evidence as empirically insufficient proof that conversion therapy caused 
harm.157 The Eleventh Circuit substituted its own scientific judgment for 
the countless organizations that filed amici as well as the government 
defendant who presented evidence when it reached that conclusion, 
constituting a major abuse of judicial discretion by the court. While 
Eleventh Circuit judges are undoubtedly capable of interpreting scientific 
information, the actual organizations comprising the vast majority of the 
relevant professional field are infinitely more qualified to interpret this 
data, and in this case, such professionals stated unequivocally that 
conversion therapy is a harmful practice for minors.158 In the words of 
Judge Martin, who dissented in Otto, a state’s interest in banning 
conversion therapy is not only supported by the opinions of numerous 
professional organizations but also “backed up by a mountain of rigorous 
evidence.”159 If a scientific consensus regarding a practice’s harmfulness 
cannot constitute proof of a legitimate government interest, then it is 
difficult to conceive of a scenario where science could ever suffice to 
support a compelling government interest.  
To discredit the weight of the scientific and professional community, 
the Eleventh Circuit argued that the collective judgment of professional 
organizations could not be allowed to silence speech.160 The court 
dubiously asserted that the First Amendment was written to prevent 
majorities from silencing less powerful voices based on the content of the 
latter’s message.161 In a general sense, this is of course true. The First 
Amendment is meant to protect the less powerful voices from being 
squashed by an authoritarian majority.162 That said, the Eleventh Circuit 
used this argument as a rationale for ignoring the overwhelming evidence 
offered by the scientific community regarding whether the state had 
established that minors actually face real danger by undergoing 
conversion therapy. Here, the majority in question is that of the scientific 
consensus in opposition to conversion therapy.163 The court also justified 
its decision that no compelling interest was established by noting that 
 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. at 858. Amicus briefs supporting this conclusion were filed by the National Center for 
Lesbian Rights, the Southern Poverty Law Center, The Trevor Project, American Psychological 
Association, Florida Psychological Association, National Association of Social Workers, National 
Association of Social Workers Florida Chapter, American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy, 
and many more organizations. Id. at 872-80 (Martin, J. dissenting). 
 159.  Id. at 878 (Martin, J. dissenting). 
 160.  Id. at 869. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Tom C. Clark, The First Amendment and Minority Rights, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 257 (1969).  
 163.  Policy, supra note 25. 
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professional organizations change their mind on topics over time.164 
Again, this flawed reasoning ignores that legislation and policy have 
always evolved in conjunction with science. For instance, as the scientific 
community developed a greater understanding of the harmful effects of 
cigarette use, the production and sale of cigarettes became increasingly 
regulated.165 While it is true that scientific organizations change positions 
on topics over time, this alone is an irrational and anti-scientific 
justification for ignoring the vast majority of the scientific community.166 
This assertion, if drawn to its logical implication, would suggest that a 
compelling interest can never be established through science, because 
science is an ever-evolving field.  
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that protecting the psychological 
and physical wellbeing of children is undeniably a compelling 
government interest.167 However, even in light of what the dissent 
characterized as “a mountain of rigorous evidence” confirming the 
negative effects of conversion therapy, the court held that the government 
interest failed strict scrutiny.168 The court pre-ordained that this ban would 
not pass strict scrutiny based on the stringent nature of this review, and 
no evidence could dissuade it from its conviction.  
C. States Should Look to These Decisions to Draft New, Conforming 
Conversion Therapy Bans 
Finally, in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Becerra and the 
Eleventh Circuit’s Otto decision, state legislatures seeking to protect 
LGBTQ+ children should draft conversion therapy restrictions that 
narrowly define the treatment to ensure the constitutionality of the law. 
In order for a conversion therapy ban to survive the standards set forth 
in these cases, such a law cannot limit how therapists can speak to their 
clients about conversion therapy.169 A law banning all discussion relating 
to conversion therapy would be plainly unconstitutional, as it would be 
regulating speech rather than treatment.170 Instead, the legislation should 
be drafted as narrowly as possible, banning the application of conversion 
therapy to minors by state-licensed professionals.171 Therapists can 
 
 164.  Otto, 981 F.3d at 869. 
 165.  Cigarettes, FDA (last visited April 27, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-
products/products-ingredients-components/cigarettes#regs.  
 166.  Lies and Dangers, supra note 16. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Otto, 981 F.3d at 878 (Martin, J. dissenting). 
 169.  See discussion supra Part II and III. 
 170.  Otto, 981 F.3d at 879 (Martin, J. dissenting) (“[A] law banning all discussion relating to SOCE 
would plainly be unconstitutional.”). 
 171.  See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (explaining that states have “broad 
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therefore talk to their minor patients about conversion therapy and even 
recommend conversion therapy from a non-licensed individual.172 Similar 
to a doctor discussing illegal drug use with a patient during a diagnosis, 
therapists would be allowed to discuss conversion therapy with minors.173 
However, they would not be able to administer the therapy through any 
means, including speech. 
In Otto, the plaintiffs argued that the conversion therapy bans were 
over-inclusive because they banned both aversive and non-aversive 
therapies.174 On one hand, a ban strictly on aversive techniques would 
outlaw the most abhorrent practices utilized in some forms of conversion 
therapy. Aversive conversion therapy bans would almost certainly be 
upheld as constitutional, as these techniques not only extend far beyond 
speech but also clearly and obviously endanger the wellbeing of 
minors.175 On the other hand, the harmful effects of non-aversive 
conversion therapy are well-documented and clearly backed by the 
weight of the professional community.176 Therefore, legislation banning 
conversion therapy would be best-served by an overall prohibition 
including a subsection that is separable from the larger legislation 
specifically banning aversive conversion therapy.177 In this way, even if 
the overarching ban is struck down as unconstitutional, the ban on 
aversive techniques could still be upheld. As these aversive techniques 
largely consist of physical tortuous practices such as electrical shocks or 
forcibly induced vomiting, they are very unlikely to be afforded First 
Amendment freedom of speech protections.178 
 
power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions.”); see 
generally King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and 
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014), 
abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 172.  The fact that unlicensed professionals may still practice conversion therapy lends itself to the 
“narrowly tailored” requirement set forth in a strict scrutiny analysis.  
 173.  Rachael McGuirk, Should You Tell Your Doctor About Your Drug Use?, THE OHIO STATE 
UNIVERSITY WEXNER MEDICAL CENTER (Aug. 19, 2020), https://wexnermedical.osu.edu/blog/should-
you-tell-your-doctor-about-your-drug-use.  
 174.  Lies and Dangers, supra note 16. Aversive “therapies” include inducing nausea, vomiting, or 
paralysis; providing electric shocks; or having the individual snap an elastic band around their wrist when 
aroused by same-sex thoughts.  In contrast, non-aversive “therapies” include hypnosis and talk therapy.   
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Fla., 981 F.3d 854, 879-80 (11th Cir. 2020) (Martin, J. dissenting) 
(“[T]he harmfulness of nonaversive SOCE is established by the record. The Localities therefore did not 
have to limit themselves to regulating aversive SOCE.”). 
 177.  Another potential drafting solution would be to separate aversive and non-aversive therapy 
bans into their own sections of the statute. The primary advantage of this approach is that the aversive 
therapy ban unambiguously stands alone and thus will almost certainly be upheld if faced with a First 
Amendment challenge. However, one downside to this approach is that it would be practically difficult to 
draft a section banning only non-aversive therapy that would not become a target of First Amendment 
challenges quickly.  
 178.  Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1226-27 (citing Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. 
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Next, potential legislation should not regulate the ability of clergy or 
religious counselors to administer conversion therapy.179 A law regulating 
religious administrations in this way would almost assuredly face 
Establishment Clause challenges.180 
Finally, the ban must be drafted to apply only to minors, whose 
protection weighs more heavily in favor of a legitimate state interest.181 
Legislation applying to all ages would almost certainly be found to be 
overly broad, but the government interest in protecting the wellbeing of 
children is well-established.182 
While the above-outlined drafting guidelines far from guarantee that a 
conversion therapy ban would be upheld as constitutional, they provide 
the best opportunity for drafting a lawful ban under current First 
Amendment freedom of speech precedent.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The safety and wellbeing of the nation’s youth must be placed ahead 
of a conversion therapist’s right to practice a scientifically debunked 
treatment. While the First Amendment’s Freedom of Speech Clause is 
vital to America’s lifeblood, the Supreme Court has long acknowledged 
exceptions to its protections, and a ban on conversion therapy should 
undoubtedly occupy one such exception.183 A near scientific consensus 
has confirmed the serious danger conversion therapy poses to minors.184 
In light of the overwhelming interest in protecting children from a 
harmful, outdated form of therapy, courts should uphold state laws that 
prohibit state-licensed professionals from administering conversion 




California Bd. of Psych., 228 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2000); and Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 
2002)) (stating that the government has more power to regulate the conduct that facilitates the treatment 
than the speech). 
 179.  Harry Farley, Gay Conversion Therapy: Hundreds of Religious Leaders Call for Ban, BBC 
NEWS (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-55326461. Interestingly, many religious leaders 
and groups around the world have recently come out in support of conversion therapy bans in the United 
States and United Kingdom.  
 180.  Id. The potential Establishment Clause facet of such potential legislation is a broader issue 
but is not the focus of this analysis.  
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
 184.  Policy, supra note 25. 
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